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Summary: The product of discrete sources and strands, the protection of fundamental rights in Europe has now begun to knit together. The diffi culties spring less from widely varying views of what fundamental rights ought to be than from their being played out upon different planes and to different purpose: pan-Europe by virtue of the European Convention on Human Rights, and pan-European Union with its economic (Community) emphasis and partially common law approach combined now with a codifi ed Charter of Fundamental Rights. Perhaps more contentious is the institutional mechanisms by which rights are to be judicially protected, the relatively coherent Convention system and the quasi-appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights through the right of individual petition, and the Community/Union system which exists in a different dimension yet embraces (or purports to embrace), but is not (yet) formally married to, the Convention -but to which, it is important to remember, the member states are signatory and still subject. The two courts at the heart of this protection, the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, have moved slowly into a closer embrace, but each remains subject still to the peculiarities of its jurisdiction, conscious of the practical limits to its authority and wary of the risks of over-confi dence and extending itself too far. Recent developments in their case law, brought about especially by the growth of Union activities which escape Luxembourg scrutiny, have brought issues to a head and produced both robustness and deference from Strasbourg. At the same time events are moving on as life is breathed back into the Constitution for Europe, which had proposed one solution, by the draft Reform Treaty, which proposes another. It also goes down the road of yet more variable geometry, a device all too easy as a means of earning agreement in the political arena but often leaving legal chaos in its wake.
There has been a long, slow, and sometimes reluctant development of fundamental rights protection within the European Community and, subsequently, the Union. Whilst by any standard a great deal has been achieved, it is still a work in progress. Recent judgments of both the Court of Justice ('Luxembourg') and the European Court of Human Rights ('Strasbourg') have now conspired to make the issues more complex still, giving heart to those who feared that we enjoyed inadequate levels of protection within the Union, yet at the same time not providing them unalloyed comfort.
What we are now witnessing is the development of multi-level or triangular protection -by Strasbourg, by Luxembourg and by national courts -for the implementation and protection of fundamental rights in the Union. It is what a recent President of the Court of Human Rights called 'détriplement fonctionnel ', 1 and it defi es both easy defi nition and easy coordination. And it is a matter not just of overlapping jurisdiction but of overlapping and cross-fertilised substantive law, yet applied by the various courts in a manner which refl ects their purpose and their legal culture.
There are a great many issues which come under the umbrella of the topic. The areas to be considered here are, fi rst, the developments relating to the surviving obligations of the member states, as signatories of and parties to the European Convention, in the Community/Union context and the continuing application of the Convention and jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights in the face of competing Union norms; and second, interwoven with the fi rst, whether the Community and/or Union, although not party to it, have absorbed, or assumed, obligations under the Convention and, if so, how they might be enforced. Events recent and in train have added new variables to the equation which make jurisdiction détriplement now an oversimplifi cation.
Treaty norms
There is a preliminary issue, sometimes overlooked, to be considered, which is the hierarchy of treaties in the Community/Union system, a function partly of public international law, partly of the Community treaties themselves. The Community, and subsequently the Union, were created by international treaties. Other than the breadth of the Community undertaking there was little in the (then) EEC Treaty to indicate a fundamental qualitative difference between it and most other international treaties -although those with eyes to see could perhaps have detected its many hints to that effect. It was not until van Gend revolutionary nature of that Treaty, and the 'new legal order' it creates, began to become apparent. So the Court may now observe glibly that the Treaty is less a treaty, more a (quasi-)constitution: 'albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, [it] none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law '. 3 And whilst van Gend en Loos confi rms the transfer of sovereignty to the Community ('for the benefi t of which the states have limited their sovereign rights'), 4 of course what the Community -still less the Union -is not is a federal or similar (and certainly not a legislative) union which would have assumed and extinguished the international personality of the member states. 5 They remain subjects of international law and in principle bound by the treaty obligations into which they entered, unless those obligations are displaced in some manner consistent with international law.
For clarity, the Treaty provides that rights and obligations deriving from treaties between one or more member states on the one hand and one or more third countries on the other which existed prior to the entry into force of the Treaty (or, for accession member states, prior to the date of their accession) 'shall not be affected' by the Treaty. 6 This is simply articulation of a principle recognised in international law, 7 and in law generally, that a contractual obligation cannot be avoided by a party entering subsequently into a different obligation with an unconnected party which is inconsistent with the fi rst:
[T]he purpose of that provision is to make it clear, in accordance with the principles of international law, that application of the EC Treaty does not affect the duty of the Member State concerned to 3 Opinion 1/91 Re the EEA Agreement [1991] ECR I-6079 para 21. In 1986 the Court had referred to judicial review of Community legislation for 'conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty'; Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 para 23. The Bundesverfassungsgericht attributed this quality to the Treaty as early as 1967 ('Der EWG-Vertrag stellt gewissermaßen die Verfassung dieser Gemeinschaft dar'); 18. Oktober 1967, BVerfGE 22, 293, 296. 4 Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos (n 2) 12. 5 This is not to touch upon the fraught subject of the international personality of the regional authorities of a federation, in particular the extent to which they may enter into treaties, a principle which, provided that the capacity is admitted in the federal constitution, has gained some recognition in international law; see Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly [1966] ILC Yearbook vol II 169, 191-192 . See also draft Article 5(2) to what became the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (n 7): 'Members of a federal union may possess capacity to conclude treaties if such capacity is admitted by the federal constitution and within the limits there laid down', which was ultimately repressed. respect the rights of third countries under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations thereunder.
8
The Treaty does however impose upon the member states an obligation to 'take all appropriate steps' to do away with any irregularities to which they give rise ('eliminate the incompatibilities established').
9
Presumably this extends to an obligation to denounce an inconsistent treaty obligation where that authority exists 10 and, where it does not, to seek to negotiate its termination. If necessary the member states are to assist each other in this end and, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude. Material amendment to a pre-existing treaty with a third country is deemed to be a new treaty, not enjoying the protection of article 307.
12
Article 307 applies to bilateral or multilateral treaties with third countries but if multilateral and involving two or more member states it does not, as a general principle, apply as between or amongst them.
13
The co-existence of the two apparently contradictory propositions was described elegantly by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice thus:
Since anything that some of the parties to a treaty do inter se under another treaty is clearly res inter alios acta, it cannot in law result in any formal diminution of the obligation of these parties under the earlier treaty, or affect juridically the rights or position of other parties, which remain legally intact and subsisting, 14 and less elegantly by the Court of Justice:
By virtue of the principles of international law, by assuming a new obligation which is incompatible with rights held under a prior treaty a state ipso facto gives up the exercise of these rights to the extent necessary for the performance of its new obligations. [...] agreements concluded between Member States before its entry into force.
15
In other words, the more recent (Community) obligations displace prior obligations of the member states inter se where the interests of third countries (or persons in third countries), of which it is the purpose of article 307 to protect, are not in issue. According to the Court of Justice, this 'cannot be criticized by third countries since [it] does not interfere with the rights held by third counties under agreements still in force '; 16 it squares this construction with the text of article 307 by distinguishing between the 'rights' to which it refers as the rights of third countries and the 'obligations' which adhere to the member states.
17
Now this is permitted in international law, but not without reservation; it is not permitted if it is forbidden by the provisions of the earlier treaty or if the latter treaty is so inconsistent with the general purpose of the earlier treaty as to be likely to frustrate it.
18
Nor is it a rule applied universally even within Community law. Exempted from it are:
• the United Nations Charter, to which all member states save Germany were contracting parties prior to their Community/Union In the same way the priority of the EC and Euratom Treaties themselves, present and future, is preserved over the Treaty on European Union, 28 so long as the Community/Union constitutional structure subsists.
What was not clear, and has only recently been made clear(er), is the place within this scheme in which the European Convention on Human Rights, to which all member states were contracting parties prior to their Community/Union accession, 29 fi nds itself. The public international law rule is relatively straightforward where a prior and a later treaty are concerned with the same, or a similar, subject matter. But the Community and the Convention exist on different planes; perhaps more accurately, douanière néerlando-belgo-luxembourgeoise; adopted 5 September 1944, entered into force 1 January 1948) 32 UNTS 143. 24 Art 306 EC Treaty. The Open Skies rule that would leave the 1958 modifi cation of Benelux and the 2002 modifi cation of the BLEU unprotected from the full force of the Treaty (see n 8) does not apply (presumably) because art 306 ring-fences not the treaties creating the BLEU and the Benelux but 'these regional unions'. In the same way the Benelux Treaty (art 94 (1) the Convention exists on its own 2-dimensional plane, but Community law -and certainly Union law taken as a whole -occupy n-dimensional space, across which the former may cut at any number of interstices. There are further, qualitative differences: whilst the medium of the Convention is by necessity a compact between states, it speaks directly to individuals and their benefi t, in a context of fundamental human rights, as against the state; the original EEC Treaty is an economic blueprint, any tangency with human rights not immediately apparent. Put differently, the Convention is primarily for the benefi t of the individual properly so-called, and a trawl through the case law of the Court of Human Rights will confi rm that it is the individual who most frequently calls upon its aid. As for Community law, the concern of directly effective Treaty rights is for the individual in its normal (if misleading) Community law sense of both natural and juridical person, and Luxembourg's meat and drink is his interests within the overriding imperative of building the common/internal market: van Gend en Loos may have been the vanguard in the wake of which all else follows, but van Gend en Loos was a naamloos venootschap, not a true individual. And the interests, and protection, of the true individual are in many respects different from that of a corporation. Added to this is the superior norm which human rights conventions may, or in the view of some ought to, occupy. The counter argument is a strict application of article 30 of the Vienna Convention, that the member states have displaced the operation of the Convention and replaced it with the Community's own system for the protection of human rights, at least where Community law applies. This would mean, if positing a Community standard which offers lesser protection than does the Convention, the higher standard applies to a citizen of the Union when exercising rights wholly unconnected with Community law; or, even more bizarrely, a Latvian, for example, enjoying greater (Convention) rights within the Community insofar as he is a subject of Community law prior to 2004, his nationality entitling him to the continuing protection of the Convention by article 307 of the Treaty, but that protection being downgraded immediately upon accession to the Union. consistent line of case law that respect for fundamental (human) rights forms a general principle of Community law, and, in the pantheon of the general principles of Community law, it is primus inter pares.
Fundamental Rights in Community/Union Law
But it is equally well known that it was not always so. The original Treaty made no mention of fundamental human rights and the Court of Justice originally repelled any argument that Community action ought to be made subject to them 31 -a view sometimes attributed now to the 'sins of youth'. From the early 1970s, and it is thought at least partially in response to fear of rebellion from the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Court of Justice has held consistently that 'respect for fundamental human rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice'.
32
As a result we are now at a stage in which the Treaty on European Union can say: 'The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States'.
33
As they are not (yet) in the Treaty, the question then arises as to where these human rights and fundamental freedoms come from.
At the moment the Court recognises three distinct but intertwined sources of fundamental rights law, 34 as follows:
a) The constitutional traditions common to the member states This was the fi rst source of fundamental rights to be recognised by the Court of Justice. But as an operational body of law they are very diffi cult to identify. The traditions run the spectrum from paragraphs 1 to 20 of the German Basic Law, a stringent catalogue of rights which forms the highest constitutional norm in the Federal Republic, to the rights of the subject which are recognised by the common law of England but which are written nowhere, are not (and cannot be) constitutionally entrenched, 35 and survive only at the whim of a government and Parliament 35 A laudable attempt was made with the Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporates the European Convention into UK law. However it does not entrench the Convention, rather it obliges public authorities to act in a manner consistent with it (s 6), requires the courts to interpret national law 'so far as it is possible to do so' in a manner compatible with Convention rights (s 3), and, if that is not possible, to make a 'declaration of incompatibility' (s of the day; and everything in between. From these the Court claims to look to, and distil, a high standard of protection rather than the lowest common denominator, but it is a complex undertaking and allows the Court signifi cant discretion.
b) International treaties
This is much clearer. For the fi rst time in 1974 -shortly after France (the last then member state to do so) ratifi ed the Convention and recognised the right of individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights -the Court fi rst took notice of international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the member states have collaborated or of which they are signatories as a source of fundamental rights recognised by Community law 36 -the most important being, of course, the European Convention, to which all member states but France had been party prior to ratifi cation of the Community/Union Treaties. The Convention is now formally recognised (and codifi ed) as such in article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, which draws it unilaterally into the Union legal system:
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [...] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.
The standard formula adopted by the Court became:
[I]t is settled case law that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of Community law whose observance is ensured by the Community judicature. For that purpose, the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated and to which they are signatories. The Convention has special signifi cance in this respect. 37 4(2)) which does not however alter the validity or effect of the law (s 4(6)). To do more would require Parliament to disable its own omnicompetence, which in British constitutional law it cannot do. For a (high profi le) example of a declaration of incompatibility see A And it is a principle which extends beyond Community law to apply also to the conduct of the Union:
[I]n accordance with Article 6(2) EU, the Union must respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. […] The Framework Decision must thus be interpreted in such a way that fundamental rights, including in particular the right to a fair trial as set out in Article 6 of the Convention and interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, are respected.
38
However, the Court was long careful to 'draw inspiration' from the Convention, and not apply it directly. Hence, it would say, for example:
Article 6(1) of the EHRC [sic] provides that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
The general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to a fair legal process, which is inspired by those fundamental rights [...] . 39 Alternatively,
Respect for that presumption [of innocence] is required of the Commission […] by virtue of the fact that it is a fundamental right guaranteed by the ECHR and therefore a general principle of Community law pursuant to Article 6(2) EU and the settled case-law of the Community Courts. 40 This is because the Community is not party to the Convention, and so, notwithstanding reference to respect of fundamental rights 'as guaranteed by the European Convention' in article 6 of the TEU, it is not 'as such' part of Community (or Union) law; 41 and under the present Treaty it has no constitutional power to accede to it.
42
However the Court edged gradually ever closer to an embrace with the Convention -for example, Advocate-General Jacobs in 1996: Although the Community itself is not a party to the Convention […] and although the Convention may not be formally binding upon the Community, nevertheless for practical purposes the Convention can be regarded as part of Community law and can be invoked as such both in this court and in national courts.
43
And in 2004 the Court, for the fi rst time, applied the Convention directly: citing case law of the Court of Human Rights which found the refusal of English law to recognise gender reassignment to breach a transsexual's right to marry under article 12 of the Convention, 44 it found it also to infringe a Community right to a spouse's pension rights, and so said:
Article 141 EC, in principle, precludes legislation, such as that at issue before the national court, which, in breach of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, prevents [the enjoyment of a Community law right].
45
More recently, in a case involving Union (not Community) legislation, it said:
[I]n accordance with Article 6(2) EU, the Union must respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention […] .
The Framework Decision must thus be interpreted in such a way that fundamental rights, including in particular the right to a fair trial as set out in Article 6 of the Convention and interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, are respected. The Court thus seems now to have acquired the taste for direct application of the Convention. It may, or may not, be relevant that four of the ten judges appointed upon the 2004 accessions had served previously as judges of the Court of Human Rights. 48 Whether formal accession to the Convention would lead to signifi cant change in the application of these principles in Community law is a matter of spirited debate. But it is incontestable that because Community conduct is not directly subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, and even if the Court of Justice 'pays the greatest heed to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights ', 49 there will inevitably be fi ssures between Strasbourg case law (on the Convention) and Luxembourg case law (on Community law inspired by it).
50
Even if applying the Convention directly as it is now increasingly wont to do, inconsistencies are very likely to arise. It is not necessarily the case that Luxembourg will get it wrong, that it will in some way be 'soft' on Convention rights: the Court of Justice has allowed and will allow human rights to trump even fundamental economic rights of the Treaty provided there is objective justifi cation and the hindrance is not disproportionate.
51
But this illustrates the cultural difference between Luxembourg and Strasbourg: the former will identify a Treaty imperative and then consider whether derogation is justifi ed by application of quite strict exculpatory rules; the latter will identify a Convention right and require its protection, subject perhaps to a public authority's margin of appreciation. They come at it from different directions. Therefore Luxembourg may get it wrong. This is, after all, why the Treaty does not trust high national courts to interpret Community law on their own and requires that they refer any such matter to the Court of Justice, 52 unless it has already been decided by the Court or its correct interpretation is acte clair. of faith in Luxembourg? -for unlike the event of a national court falling short on Convention standards, there is no right of petition from a Luxembourg judgment. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe required the Union to seek accession to the Convention, 54 so removing the present treaty bar, and that provision is intended by the European Council to survive into the redrafted Reform Treaty; 55 but it will also require, fi rst, amendment to the Convention itself, for it is ancillary to the Council of Europe, which at present is open for accession to states only; and second, serious consideration of the collaboration, and hierarchy, between Strasbourg and Luxembourg.
c) The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
This is the clearest, least nebulous, purpose built codifi cation of fundamental rights in Community law.
56
It is the fruit of long debate within the Union on the nature of fundamental rights: the rights which ought to be embraced, whether they ought to be legally binding, and if so how, whether they ought to be incorporated into Treaty texts or simply 'declared', and if so by whom, whether they ought to bind (if anyone) the Community/Union institutions only, the member states acting within Community/Union spheres, the member states in areas unrelated to Community law, and so on. In the event, the Charter is a fairly comprehensive codifi cation of essentially personal rights 'recognised' by the Union 57 -54 articles divided into seven chapters, addressing dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens' rights, justice, and a fi nal chapter on general provisions. It is unique amongst international instruments in the breadth of its subject matter.
But the Charter does not form part of the Treaty. It was adopted at the Nice Summit in December 2000 by the Parliament, the Council and the Commission by 'solemn proclamation', so, however 'solemn', it is a product not of the constituent authorities of the Treaties (the Herren der Verträge) but of the three political institutions. This they had done once before, 58 admittedly far less ambitiously, and to limited effect. Further, at 54 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe art I-9(2). Nice the member states least enthusiastic of fundamental rights initiatives secured a victory of sorts. Article 51 of the Charter (within the chapter on general provisions, defi ning the 'Scope' of the Charter) provides:
1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers.
2. This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defi ned by the Treaties.
There is real concern that the application of the Charter to the conduct of the member states 'only when they are implementing [uniquement lorsqu'ils mettent en oeuvre] Union law' is a backward step, excluding judicial control over national measures which derogate from Community rules. There is as yet no judicial authority on this.
Even though outside the Treaties, the Charter yields greater precision to those rights already recognised as forming part of Community law. Within two months of its adoption it was being cited, with approbation, by an Advocate-General as an aid to interpretation of a social policy directive. ample, the cornerstone of the (now) decentralised enforcement of Community competition rules, provides that
[t]his Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Accordingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and principles.
62
This fi xes the Charter to the given fi eld of Community law and requires its application thereto, at least insofar as a preambular reference has relevance to the application of a regulation; if nothing else it ought to concentrate the minds of the authorities wielding it. And the more often it is fl agged up, the more familiar it becomes.
However signifi cant a step the Charter may be, it may grow to become more signifi cant still. Certainly '[t] he Commission considers that the Charter, by reason of its content, its tight drafting and its high political and symbolic value, ought properly to be incorporated in the Treaties sooner or later.'
63
It was in the event (intended to be) incorporated into the Treaties sooner, by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, comprising Part II (of four Parts). There are minor, 'though signifi cant, differences between the text of the Charter and the text adopted in the Constitution, but essentially they are the same thing. So, had the Treaty been ratifi ed, the Charter would have acquired 'constitutional' status, and its place within the Community/Union hierarchy of norms would be much clearer. The Constitutional Treaty now abandoned but much of it cannibalised in the Reform Treaty, the solution now proposed is, rather than Treaty incorporation, that the Union 'recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter […] which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties' 64 (emphasis added) and will have 'legally binding force '. 65 This is a half-way house, designed primarily not to frighten the (British) horses; but it seems likely the Charter (in its Constitutional Treaty version) it may in substance be wider, the Convention forming a subset ratione materiae of the more broadly framed Charter. Therefore a robust application of the Charter will necessarily be on all fours with the Convention. A safeguard to this purpose may be found in the Charter itself:
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.
70
The question is whether the Court of Justice will apply it robustly, or as robustly as Strasbourg would the Convention 'corresponding rights' which forms its core. Synergy between Charter and Convention may be achieved by other means, for example by the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights created in 2002 by the Commission upon a recommendation of the Parliament to report on human rights situations within the Union: it uses the Charter as its 'reference instrument', but it is 'indexed' to international and European human rights law.
71
But whilst it may come to achieve much, the Network marks yet further decentralisation of authority in the fi eld.
Sanctions for non-compliance with human rights in the Union
Note must be taken of the sanctions now available where a member state fails to comply with its human rights obligations within the Union. Article 6 of the TEU, which applies to all Union (including Community) activity, provides:
67 Charter of Fundamental Rights art 51. 1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention […] .
In 1996 the Court of Justice said that the institutions had no power to adopt general rules on human rights.
72
This was remedied, at least in the view of the Commission, by amendments made to article 7 of the TEU by the Treaty of Nice, 73 article 7 now providing the authority and mechanism for the adoption of sanctions against a member state found 'serious[ly] and persistent [ly] ' to breach the principles set out in article 6(1).
74
The power of sanction applies in Union matters and is expressly carried over into the Community sphere 75 but, according to the Commission, its scope is not confi ned to them.
76
If this is so, the Union may vent its displeasure against a member state even where it is acting wholly within the national domain, or acting in some other way which has no Community/Union/Charter element. The closest practical instance of this is l'affaire autrichienne in 2000, in which 14 of the then 15 member states sought to boycott Austria in a number of Community, Union and non-Union spheres in order to protest at the (minor) participation in federal government of the Freiheits Partei Österreich. 74 Action taken under art 7 now takes two forms: fi rst (a Nice innovation), upon a 'reasoned proposal' from the Parliament, the Commission or one third of the member states, and with the assent of the Parliament (acting by a two-thirds majority vote representing a majority of MEPs), the Council may by a majority of four-fi fths of its members determine that there is a 'clear risk of a serious breach' of art 6(1) and address appropriate recommendations (but no more) to the errant member state (art 7(1)). Second, upon a proposal from the Commission or one third of the member states, and with the (same weighted) assent of the Parliament, the Council, meeting in the composition of heads of state or government, may by unanimity (excepting the vote of the errant member state) determine the existence of a 'serious and persistent breach' of art 6(1), after which the Council may by qualifi ed majority suspend 'certain of' the member state's Treaty rights, including Council voting rights (art 7(2)-(5)). 77 In the 1999 election the FPÖ won 27 percent of the popular vote, making it the second largest party in the Nationalrat, and agreed to form a collation government with the Öster-reichische Volkspartei (ÖVP). This led to weekly demonstrations (the Donnerstagsdemonstrationen) in Vienna and the boycott measures adopted by the other member states. The 'Statement of the XIV' said this state of affairs would last 'as long as necessary', but crumbled after 7 months. It raises the interesting question of whether the boycott itself was recourse, and the events cannot be taken as action adopted pursuant, to article 7; in fact a subsequent report exonerated Austria of human rights abuses of any kind. 78 Nor has action been taken under article 7 following the 2003 invasion of Iraq against the member states party to it, notwithstanding war of aggression being identifi ed by the European Parliament as 'a clear risk of a breach […] or an actual breach' of article 6.
79
In the view of one commentator, '[i]f an external war and occupation of a sovereign state did not create a prima facie situation for scrutiny it is hard to imagine any condition other than the most extreme form of tyrannical behaviour forcing a response.' have drawn no fi re. This is of course the major weakness of article 7, namely its fi erce procedural hurdles: if member states work together to a common purpose, or at least in mutual contempt of fundamental rights, suffi cient support in the Council for effective action is unlikely to be mustered. It was hoped by some that the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (EUAFR), which took up its duties in March 2007, 86 would be afforded some formal role in the application of article 7, but they were to be denied. Its scope is further restricted to the application of Community law, 87 which leaves it powerless to pursue (alleged) Convention breaches by the Union under Titles V or VI and by member states in wholly national spheres. So the Agency may 'assist' in 88 and 'deal with ', 89 for example, discrimination in employment law for its inconsistency with fundamental human rights, but not so invasion and torture.
The protection of human rights in Europe therefore still springs less from political institutions than from the courts -and increasingly, a double act between the Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice.
There is a slow growth of recognition -and slower still, respect -between the two courts. They now cite each other with increasing regularity and, more recently, approbation. It is natural for the Court of Justice to do so, the Treaty now citing the Convention and the Court of Human Rights an obvious authority in its interpretation, although the Court (as opposed to the Advocates-General) did so expressly for the fi rst time only in 1996. This may be likened to an (amicable) game of chess between Strasbourg and Luxembourg; put otherwise, 'a symbiotic interaction of fragile complexity, continuously working out a solution to the sometimes awkward co-existence of the EU and the ECHR'.
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In order best to understand whither this danse judicaire has now led us, and the (precarious) balance now struck, it will be necessary to consider four recent judgments, two from Strasbourg and two from Luxembourg. 
Matthews
Miss Matthews was a citizen and resident of Gibraltar, part of Her Majesty's dominions for which the United Kingdom is responsible in international (and Community) law, but constitutionally distinct from the UK. In accordance with article 227(4) of the EC Treaty, it became part of the Community with UK accession in 1973, but it is not part of the customs territory, and in many ways is treated as a third country. Citizens of Gibraltar are citizens of the Union. The issue here for present purposes was that the measure which it was claimed infringed the Convention was a measure adopted under the three Community treaties. More accurately, it was a peculiar instrument envisaged in, and called for by, the Treaty 97 but was not an act of the institutions acting under Treaty authority (which is normally the case), rather it was adopted in the form of a decision of the Council composed of representatives of the member states ('the member states au sein du Conseil') and acting unanimously, and made effective by its subsequent ratifi cation by all member states. Once in force it acquired Treaty status. Because it was a measure adopted by the Communities it could not be challenged before the Court of Human Rights because they are not contracting parties to the Convention. And nor could it be challenged in Luxembourg, for it was not a normal Community act, rather it had treaty status and was beyond the reach of the Court of Justice. The issue was therefore whether the United Kingdom could be held accountable for the (alleged) breach of the Convention.
The Commission of Human Rights (the case having been raised before the Commission became redundant in 1998) found the application admissible but by 11 votes to 6 found that there had been no violation of article 3 of protocol 1. The Court (by 15 votes to 2) disagreed.
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Article 1 of the Convention requires the High Contracting Parties to 'secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defi ned in [the] Convention'. It makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned, and does not exclude any part of the member States' 'jurisdiction' from scrutiny. But can the UK be responsible for a rule adopted by Community authorities, from which there was no derogation and which could be changed only with the consent of all member states?
The Community is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights. But whilst it does not object to transfer of state competences to an international organisation, the Convention requires that its rights continue to be 'secured'. Member States' responsibility therefore continues and survives even after such a transfer.
Here then is the answer, the Strasbourg view of the continuing place of the Convention in Community (and Union) law, and implicitly article 30 of the Vienna Convention and article 307 of the EC Treaty. It is a half-way house, put with greater clarity in another, contemporaneous judgment:
[W]here States establish international organisations in order to pursue or strengthen their cooperation in certain fi elds of activities, and where they attribute to these organisations certain competences and accord them immunities, there may be implications as to the protection of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention, however, if the Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the fi eld of activity covered by such attribution. the Convention provided that Convention rights 'receive an equivalent protection' 100 or continue to be 'secured '. 101 This accords with the (subsequent) opinion of the EU network of independent experts on fundamental rights:
Where contracting parties fail to take human rights properly into account, or where a treaty leads to infringements of human rights whether or not such violations could be anticipated when the treaty was concluded, the parties concerned can be held responsible for such violations: the obligation to secure the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms continues to exist after the conclusion of a treaty with third parties. This is in conformity with the rule expressed in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties […] .
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It is also entirely in harmony with the legal thinking of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its Solange I judgment.
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Here, the violation fl ows from a Community act, entered into by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, together with all other member states, is responsible ratione materiae under article 1 of the Convention and, in this case in particular, under article 3 of protocol 1, for the consequences of the Treaty. The Court therefore found for Miss Matthews, who recovered no damages (she had claimed none) but was awarded costs and, from the 2004 European elections, the right to vote.
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So Matthews tells us that Convention responsibilities and Convention jurisdiction remain alive for the member states even within the Community cocoon. The Community may succeed to the member states' obligations under the Convention, but if the Community fails to comply with them, the responsibility of the member state will reassert itself. The problem with Matthews is that the issue involved the application of a Community measure which was beyond the control of the Court of Justice. This The UK law adopted to comply with the judgment of the Court (the European Parliamentary (Representation) Act 2003) was challenged before the Court of Justice by Spain (Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-7917, one of the very rare cases of enforcement proceedings raised under art 227 by a member state) on the grounds that the peculiarity of UK electoral law which grants full voting rights to resident non-UK Commonwealth citizens, and so enfranchising for elections to the European Parliament (some one hundred) non-citizens of the Union resident in Gibraltar, infringed various provisions of the Treaty. The Court disagreed, fi nding Community law not to preclude a member state from enfranchising third country nationals 'who have close links to [it]' (para 78).
does not happen often, most Community law is reviewable by the Court; this was not. The question is then whether Convention responsibility will survive where there is control (effective or otherwise) in Luxembourg.
Jégo-Quéré and Unión de Pequeños Agricultores
It was anticipated that the test would come in the context of article 6 of the Convention, which provides for and requires effective judicial protection of rights. In 2002 there was some excitement in Community circles when the Court of Justice began to play with the Treaty scheme for the judicial protection of the individual before it -in essence the question of whether individual access to the Court under article 230 of the EC Treaty for the judicial challenge of a Community measure, as fi rst defi ned in the Plaumann judgment, 105 afforded adequate protection for the rights of the individual. Advocate-General Jacobs thought not: he proposed that the Community system was inadequate; it was arbitrary; it was restrictive; it was discriminatory; it would in many cases require the individual to breach the law, and sometimes criminal law, in order to trigger judicial review of the law. This situation 'does not offer the individual an adequate means of judicial protection. Individuals clearly cannot be required to breach the law in order to gain access to justice.' 106 Therefore he said, the Community system was incompatible with the principle of effective judicial protection (implicitly as required by article 6 of the Convention), and proposed a signifi cant re-evaluation of the case law under article 230, so that an individual should be regarded as individually concerned within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC by a Community measure where, by reason of his particular circumstances, the measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on his interests. manner which is both defi nite and immediate, by restricting his rights or by imposing obligations on him. The number and position of other persons who are likewise affected by the measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance in that regard.
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But, as is well known, the Court of Justice disagreed. The present system was quite adequate: the restricted access to the Court was a Treaty requirement, which could not be altered not by the Court but only by the member states, by treaty amendment. Until that should happen, it is the responsibility of the member states to ensure the existence of a system of legal remedies and procedures which adequately guarantee the right to effective judicial protection.
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The judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores was one of the full Court (13 judges), and one clearly intended to constitute an arrêt de principe on the matter; it has been reconfi rmed since.
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But it seems to a number of commentators that it is clearly wrong, and it is wrong because it was inconsistent with the Convention, in particular, of course, article 6. There was a feeling abroad that this may well be the Luxembourg view, but should Strasbourg ever be afforded the opportunity of pronouncing a view of the subject, however diffi cult that may be, the answer would be very different.
Strasbourg has now had the opportunity. And the answer is surprising.
Bosphorus
In 1992 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS, an airline charter company registered in Turkey with its seat in Istanbul, leased two aircraft from JAT, the national airline of the former Yugoslavia. The lease was for a period of 48 months from the dates of delivery of the two aircraft (22 April and 6 May 1992). The two aircraft were registered under the Turkish fl ag as foreseen by the lease.
In May 1993 one of the aircraft arrived in Dublin for maintenance work by an Irish company. A month earlier the UN Security Council had adopted a resolution 111 requiring all UN states to impound, inter alia, all aircraft in their territories 'in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating' from the former Yugoslav Republic. The resolution was implemented in and for the Community by a regulation which entered into force at the end of April.
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In June, in accordance with Irish law giving effect to the regulation, 113 the Minister for Transport impounded the aircraft.
In November 1993 Bosphorus challenged the Minister's decision before the High Court. The High Court interpreted the Community regulation not to apply to the aircraft, and so the Minister had acted ultra vires.
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The Minister then re-imposed his decision, and at the same time appealed the judgment of the High Court to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided it was bound to refer the question to the Court of Justice under article 234, and accordingly asked it, in effect, whether the aircraft was caught by, and the situation fell within, the regulation. The Advocate-General (Jacobs) addressed the question of fundamental rights at length, included amongst them a right to peaceful enjoyment of property, found a severe interference with Bosphorus's property rights, but that in the circumstances it was justifi ed and not disproportionate. The Court agreed:
Article 8 of Regulation No 990/93 applies to an aircraft which is owned by an undertaking based in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) even though the owner has leased it for four years to another undertaking, neither based in nor operating from that republic and in which no person or undertaking based in or operating from that republic has a majority or controlling interest.
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Four weeks later the Minister re-instated the impounding of the aircraft.
In 1997, following lapse of the lease and relaxation of the sanctions regime, the aircraft was returned to JAT (but which, to add insult to injury, was required to pay IR£389,609.95 to cover parking, maintenance, insurance and legal costs). In March Bosphorus lodged a complaint against Ireland with the European Commission of Human Rights, which was then transmitted to the Court. Essentially the complaint alleged a breach of article 1 of protocol 1, which provides:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
The case was assigned to the Grand Chamber of the Court. It gave its judgment in June 2005. 116 What was remarkable in the judgment was the extensive consideration of Community law and practice by Strasbourg. The Luxembourg court makes increasing reference to Strasbourg case law (the AdvocatesGeneral extensively so), but here the shoe was on the other foot. The Court of Human Rights considered, and discussed at length:
• the development of the Luxembourg case law on fundamental rights;
• the Treaty provisions, particularly article 6 TEU, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the provisions of the constitutional Treaty;
• the application of articles 10, 249 and 307 of the EC Treaty;
• the mechanisms of judicial protection in Community law, in particular articles 230, 232, 241, 288, direct effect, indirect effect, state liability and article 234, and the extent of judicial protection afforded the individual, citing Unión de Pequeños Agricultores at considerable length.
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As to substance, the Irish government argued that the state was bound by the Luxembourg ruling. To do otherwise, even with a view to Convention compliance, would be contrary to its obligation of 'loyal cooperation' required by Community law. It argued essentially that Luxembourg and Strasbourg human rights protection were of an equivalent quality, and relied essentially upon M & Co., the 1990 decision of the Commission of Human Rights 118 which found inadmissible a Convention challenge to a German measure enforcing a sanction (a pecuniary fi ne) adopted by the European Commission -as a national authority is obliged automatically to do Bosphorus distinguished M & Co. as an act of an international organisation over the elaboration of which the member state had no infl uence and in the execution of which the state had no discretion. Since it was not challenging the provisions of Regulation 990/93 or the sanctions regime per se, any 'equivalent protection' principle of the M & Co. was not relevant. On the contrary, Ireland had been intimately involved in the adoption and application of the regulation and had, at all material times, a real and reviewable discretion as to the means by which the result required by it could be achieved. More generally, while the Convention did not exclude the transfer of competences to international organisations, the member state had to continue to secure Convention rights, otherwise it could escape its Convention responsibility once its courts referred a question and implemented a Luxembourg ruling. This would create an unacceptable lacuna of human rights protection in Europe. And in any event, Community law did not offer 'equivalent protection', and the procedure of article 234 of the EC Treaty was inadequate to ensure the level of protection required by article 6 of the Convention.
The EC Commission, as intervener, argued that whilst a State retained some Convention responsibility after it had ceded powers to an international organisation, that responsibility was fulfi lled once there was proper provision in that organisation's structure for effective protection of fundamental rights at a level at least 'equivalent' to that of the Convention. It therefore supported the approach adopted in M & Co. Ireland had no discretion here.
The Court found after extensive consideration, that what was at issue was not the result of an exercise of discretion by the Irish authorities, either under Community or Irish law, but rather amounted to compliance by the Irish State with its legal obligations fl owing from EC law and, in particular, article 8 of Regulation 990/93. Then:
[T]he Court has recognised that absolving Contracting States completely from their Convention responsibility in the areas covered by such a transfer would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention: the guarantees of the Convention could be limited or excluded at will thereby depriving it of its peremptory character and undermining the practical and effective nature of its safeguards. The State is considered to retain Convention liability in respect of treaty commitments subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention.
In the Court's view, State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justifi ed as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides. By 'equivalent' the Court means 'comparable': any requirement that the organisation's protection be 'identical' could run counter to the interest of international co-operation pursued. However, any such fi nding of equivalence could not be fi nal and would be susceptible to review in the light of any relevant change in fundamental rights' protection.
If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal obligations fl owing from its membership of the organisation. However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly defi cient. In such cases, the interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by the Convention's role as a 'constitutional instrument of European public order' in the fi eld of human rights […] .
Since the impugned act constituted solely compliance by Ireland with its legal obligations fl owing from membership of the EC, the Court will now examine whether a presumption arises that Ireland complied with its Convention requirements in fulfi lling such obligations and whether any such presumption has been rebutted in the circumstances of the present case.
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As to whether or not the presumption could or should be rebutted here, the Court examined the development of fundamental rights in Community law, and observed that although individual access to the Court in Luxembourg was limited, the availability of remedies before a national court 'greatly enlarged the role of the domestic courts in the enforcement of Community law and its fundamental rights' guarantees.' 121 Then, '[i] n [the present] circumstances, the Court fi nds that the protection of fundamental rights by EC law can be considered to be, and to have been at the relevant time, 'equivalent' to that of the Convention system. Consequently, the presumption arises that Ireland did not depart from the requirements of the Convention when it implemented legal obligations fl owing from its membership of the EC. Finally, it went on the fi nd that there was no reason by which the presumption could be rebutted in the case, found 'no dysfunction of the mechanisms of control of the observance of Convention rights ', 123 and therefore found no violation of the Convention.
Where We Are Now
The judgment in Bosphorus was a unanimous judgment, all 17 judges agreeing, of the Grand Chamber, and so a serious and authoritative contribution to the debate. Where does it lead us? First, it illustrates and reinforces the multi-level structure of fundamental rights protection in the European legal order. At fi rst blush the logic of the judgment is reminiscent of that of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Solange II 124 and in the Bananas judgment.
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But in fact the logic applies in reverse, and Strasbourg is showing a deference to Luxembourg which, fi rst, Luxembourg never allows national courts, and second, is perhaps not wholly reassuring. At its core the problem is the differences in jurisdiction and legal culture between Luxembourg and Strasbourg, and the hierarchical relationship (if it exists) between the two. Luxembourg will not tolerate, for example, the German Basic Law reserving to German courts a fundamental rights jurisdiction because Community law must be uniform. Why this should be a less pressing concern for Strasbourg, mutatis mutandis, is not clear. And can it ever be uniform when applied by the two courts? Does this mean lesser human rights protection in the 27 European states contracting parties to the Convention and within the Union and greater in the 19 outside? Or can a higher Union standard (should it exist) fl ow the other way, so that Community judges are instrumental in shaping the meaning of the Convention as it applies, say, in the Russian Federation?
There is one comforting difference in this comparison: it appears from the Bananas judgment that Karslruhe now requires a general or very signifi cant abnegation by Luxembourg of duty to protect human rights before it will resuscitate its jurisdiction and intervene, Strasbourg will presumably remain steadfast in those cases of Community measures which cannot be brought within Luxembourg's jurisdiction, as it was in Matthews. And it is of key importance to note that this applies in ever widening fi elds. First, there are extensive tangencies between Convention matters and Union activities under Titles V and VI of the TEU but much of Union activity (and some related Community activity) escapes Luxembourg scrutiny altogether. 136 If, say, the Council adopts a framework decision under Title VI which is then implemented by a measure of transformation adopted by a national authority in a member state which has not made a declaration under article 35(2) of the TEU, Luxembourg is effectively barred from reviewing it; but in light of Matthews the member state may be called to account before its national courts and, ultimately, Strasbourg. The variable geometry of this -as well as support for the view held by some that Luxembourg is overly deferential to the Community (or here, Union) legislature -is apparent over 135 Opinion of Judge Ress paras 1, 2.
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See Art 35 TEU, which allows for references to be made to the Court of Justice from national courts on the validity and interpretation of some Title VI measures but only if the relevant member state has made an enabling declaration to that effect under art 35(2), so introducing a degree of 'judicial variable geometry' into the Court's jurisdiction. The necessary declarations have been made by 14 member states -that is, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden. This applies mutatis mutandis under Title IV of the EC Treaty (on visas, asylum, immigration and the free movement of persons), art 68 limiting the reference power to courts of fi nal instance and expressly ousting from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice art 62(1) matters (on abolition of controls on the trans-frontier movement of persons) if they relate to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.
the European arrest warrant, 137 which was given a clean bill of health by the Court of Justice 138 but has failed to pass human rights muster in the constitutional courts of at least two member states.
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The Court of Justice had jurisdiction to consider the validity of the framework decision in Advocaten voor de Wereld because the Belgian Arbitragehof enjoyed the authority to ask the question; this would not be the case for the courts of 13 other member states. Are the courts of those 13 member states bound by, or even entitled to take notice of, the validity of the framework decision as determined in the judgment? Does it mean standards will be higher (or at least different) there, with Strasbourg alone competent to determine its human rights compatibility?
Perhaps even more worrying are the legal obligations emanating from outwith even the Union, and in particular the new, post-cold war activism of the UN Security Council. On substance the Security Council is probably bound in its conduct by the UN Charter, jus cogens, and universal instruments such as, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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These are worthy enough, but they are in comparison with the Convention and the Charter rudimentary. Do we wish the will of the Security Council to be free of them within Europe? And on simple procedure, who will protect us from the Security Council? Not the Hague, because the individual cannot invoke the jurisdiction of that Court. Not Luxembourg, for, as we now know, the Court of Justice will neither review nor otherwise interfere with the application of a Security Council resolution except insofar as it constitutes a breach of jus cogens.
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And not Strasbourg, if it places too much trust in Luxembourg.
The next chapter is likely to involve yet more Treaty-entrenched variable geometry, addressing the Charter itself. At the June 2007 European Council in Brussels which agreed the 'draft IGC mandate' which has breathed life back into the Constitutional Treaty, the United Kingdom secured, as a price of its agreement, the promise of an opt-out from the 139 National laws giving effect to the framework decision were struck down by the Trybunal Konstytucyjny (27 kwietnia 2005 r., P 1/05 (Europejski Nakaz Aresztowania)) and the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG, 18. Juli 2005 (Europäischer Haftbefehl-Beschluß) , BVerfGE 113, 273), albeit not for Convention incompatibility but for breaching the human rights guarantees of the Polish constitution and the German Basic Law, respectively. why they are to enjoy such pre-eminence in the protocol. If the intention is merely to emphasise Title IV, the pudding may have been over-egged: the link with the fi rst paragraph is 'for the avoidance of doubt', rather than the more common (at least in British style) 'for greater certainty', sometimes with the added emphasis of 'but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing', and it may result in Title IV matters being severed from the rest of the Charter and the fi rst paragraph being read down to that extent; it mimics the opt-out of the Social Protocol and Agreement the United Kingdom 'enjoyed' from 1993 Kingdom 'enjoyed' from to 1998 if through the back door, and would in any event be largely Convention compatible, because it is more Charter of Fundamental Social Rights than Convention territory. If taken to a wider amplitude, the Charter will not 'extend' (étend; ausdehnen) the 'abilities' (faculté; Befugnis) of competent courts across the fi elds of Charter application. These are provisions which betray either ignorance of legal terminology ('ability' of a court?) and logic (extend whence?) or an unfathomable intent. But read generously, their intention, and maybe their effect, is to oust from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and of British courts the power to measure British laws against the Charter when, necessarily (because the Charter is of no wider application), they implement Union law. If so it may represent a signifi cant own goal, for if the Court of Justice is deprived of it its normal task of review of national legislation for Charter compatibility, it may be inviting others to fi ll the gap, leaving British law bared to Convention control by Strasbourg by default -more Matthews than Bosphorus -and, reverting back to Judge Wildhaber's détriplement fonctionnel, 147 in the hands of national courts unmoderated by Luxembourg deference; and since the incorporation of the Convention into UK law in 1998, 148 British courts have shown themselves not to be reticent in using it.
In the end the protocol may apply to the United Kingdom alone, or it may within the IGC become infectious, in which case any achievement in 'recognising' the Charter and its legally binding force is diminished. But its important may be more political: doubtless the opt-out will meet with the approval of the British House of Commons, and would appeal to the British people in the event of the referendum once promised but now withheld. It is not clear the Irish would be so sanguine: it would be ironic 146 By virtue of agreement reached at Maastricht the United Kingdom was absolved of adherence to much of Community social legislation. The mechanism for giving effect to this opt-out was contained in a protocol to the EC Treaty (the Protocol on Social Policy). Following agreement with the Labour government elected in 1997, the legislation was extended to the United Kingdom and the Social Protocol was subsequently deleted from the Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam with its entry into force in 1999. 147 See n 1. 148 Human Rights Act 1998. if the Constitutional Treaty, having after a two year 'period of refl ection' emulated Lazarus in the form of the Reform Treaty, were again to fall upon the popular will, in the (compulsory) Irish referendum prior to ratifi cation 149 owing to efforts by the government to withhold from the Irish people Charter rights enjoyed in (most) other member states.
